Front-Seat Adventures: Forfeiting Fundamental
Fairness and a 1977 Pontiac
Forfeiture is a concept common in American jurisprudence2
that is grounded in world history.! Indeed, the law of forfeiture
dates back to the beginning of recorded time.' For example, both
early Greek 5 and Roman manuscripts attest to the practice of civil
I See BLAcK's LAw DicnONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990) (defining forfeiture as the
i[l]oss of some right or property as a penalty for some illegal act."); Alice Marie
O'Brien, 'Caught in the Crassfire': Protecting the Innocent Owner of Real Propertyfivm
Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7), 65 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 521, 521 (1991)
(stating that forfeiture involves governmental confiscation without compensation of
pro!erty that was illegally used or acquired).
SeeAnne-Marie Feeley, Forfeitureof MaritalPoperty Under2l U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7):
IrreconcilableDifferences?, 37 ViL. L. REv. 1487, 1492 (1992) (noting that since the
ratification of the Constitution, forfeiture has been recognized as a legal concept in
American jurisprudence); see also United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111,
118-23 (1993) (discussing the history of forfeiture law in the United States).
3 See O'Brien, supra note 1, at 523-24.
4 See OuLVER WENDF.L HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (1923). In
fact, the
roots of forfeiture law can be traced back to the Old Testament. See id. For example, Exodus 21:28 of the Bible provides that, when an ox gores a person and that
person dies from the inflicted injuries, the ox must be stoned and its flesh may not
be consumed; the owner of the ox, however, will not be held culpable for the acts of
the animal. See id. (citing Exodus 21:28). This passage from Exodus is considered a
precursor to modern day forfeiture law. See O'Brien, supra note 1, at 524 n.18. The
in rem forfeiture of an ox as an offer to God is mandated by the Old Testament regardless of the guilt or innocence of the ox's owner. See id.; see also Dennis R
Hewitt, Comment, Civil Forfeitureand Innocent Third Parties,3 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 323,
326 (1983) (commenting that Exodus 21:28 endorses the view that the property is
guilty of any wrongdoing while the fault of the owner is irrelevant); see also CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974) (noting that the
guilt or innocence of the owner under the Old Testament rule was of no consequence). But seeJacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Soie HistoricalPerspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 169, 180 (1973) (commenting that the forfeiture of the animal was not an offer to God).
5 See O'Brien, supranote 1, at 524. The laws governing the ancient Greeks contained countless provisions regarding the forfeiture of property associated with specific wrongs. See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 7-8. For example, under laws espoused
by Plato, if a slave caused the death of a person, the slave's owner was required to
forfeit the offending slave to the relatives of the deceased. See id. Additionally, if an
animal or other piece of personal property caused a man's or woman's death, the
animal or property would be exiled beyond the borders. See id. at 8. Early forfeiture law is further illustrated by an ancient Greek law commanding that "if a man
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forfeiture.8 It was the English, however, who translated the archaic
principle into contemporary rules of law by classifying forfeiture
into three categories:! (1) deodand, (2) common-law forfeiture,"0
and (3) statutory forfeiture." Current American jurisprudence reccommits suicide, bury the hand that struck the blow afar from its body." Id. This
directive demonstrates the early Greek belief that the offending object was the
cause of the wrong and, therefore, had to be placed outside of society.
6 See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 8-9. As early as 451 B.C., evidence of forfeiture
provisions appear in Roman law. See id. at 8. Roman law provided that "if an animal
had done damage, either the animal was to be surrendered or the damage paid
for." Id. Similar to the Biblical and Greek provisions, these actions did not depend
on fault of the owner. See id. at 9.
7 See HOLMES, supra note 4, at 24-25; see also Calero-Toledo,
416 U.S. at 680-83
(tracing the development of forfeiture law to early English jurisprudence).
$ See Feeley, supranote 2, at 1493.
9 See id. In fact, the term deodand derives from the Latin Deo Dandurn, "to be
given to God." Cakero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681 n.16. Black's Law Diction y defines
deodand as "any personal chattel which was the immediate occasion of the death of
any reasonable creature, and which was forfeited to the crown to be applied to pious
uses, and distributed in alms by the high almoner." BLACK'S LAW DIcnoNA, 436
(6th ed. 1990). At common law, the value of any animal or inanimate object that
directly or indirectly caused the death of a human being would be forfeited to the
King or Queen as deodand. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681. The Crown would
then distribute the value to its subjects in the name of God. See id.
The concept of deodand laid the foundation for the modem day in rem forfeiture proceeding. See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1493. Both the old and new rationales
are based on the legal fiction that the owner's fault was not a factor in the property's
forfeiture. See id.
Over time, the deodand concept evolved to encompass all objects involved in
criminal activity. See id. Deodands became a large generator of the Crown's revenue. See Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 681. As English jurisprudence progressed, deodands soon disappeared. See id. Despite the absence of the deodand institution,
the English retained the concept of forfeiting property involved in criminal activity.
See id. at n.19. Thus, a concept born as a purely religious idea evolved to serve a
modem method of deterrence. See id. at 681 & n.19.
10 See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1493. Common-law forfeiture later developed into
in personam forfeiture proceedings. See id. At common law, forfeiture resulted
from a conviction of a felony or treason. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. Subsequent to the conviction, an in personam proceeding was held against the convict.
See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1493. A convicted felon forfeited his personal property
to the Crown and his lands to his lord. See Calero-Toedo, 416 U.S. at 682. In contrast, the convicted traitor forfeited both his chattels and real property to the
Crown. See id. Common-law forfeiture was justified because "a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace." Id.
n See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1494. Statutory forfeiture involved a civil action
against an object used in violation of customs or revenue laws. See id. Given an in
rem proceeding, the innocence or guilt of the owner was not a factor because the
property itself was the offending party. See id. at 1487. Statutory forfeiture laid the
foundation for in rem forfeiture proceedings. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682
(attributing statutory forfeiture as the product of the merger between deodand tradition and the legal premise that ownership of property can be denied to the
wrongdoer).
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ognizes two basic types of forfeiture proceedings: 12 (1) in rem proceedings, which are conducted against the property,' and (2) inPersonam proceedings, which are conducted against the person. A
shared history suggests that English classifications influenced American forfeiture law.' In both systems, an owner's innocence does not
constitute a defense to a civil forfeiture proceeding. In fact, there
have been countless cases in which innocent owners have forfeited
their property due to the illegal acts of others.'
12

SeFeeley, supra note 2, at 1487-88.
See id. at 1487 (explaining that in rem proceedings are brought by a govern-

mental entity against property involved with a statutorily defined illegal activity). In
rem proceedings are synonymous with civil forfeiture proceedings. See id.; see also
BLACK's LAwDi ONAoR 793 (6th ed. 1990) (defining in rem as "[a] technical term
used to designate proceedings or actions instituted againstthe thing.....").
Civil forfeiture of property may occur regardless of the guilt or innocence of
the owner of the property. See Hewitt, supra note 4, at 325. Therefore, an innocent
owner's property may be subject to in rem forfeiture despite that the owner neither
knew of nor consented to the property's involvement in the illegal activity. See id.
14 See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1492; see also BLAc's
LAw DIcnoNAR" 791 (6th ed.
1990) (defining an in personam proceeding as an "[a]ction seeking judgment
against a person involving his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his person. .. ."). In contrast to in rem proceedings, which are brought against the property, in personarn proceedings, also known as criminal forfeitures, are brought
against an owner of property in response to the owner's involvement in criminal
activity. See Feeley, supra note 2, at 1487-88. Criminal forfeiture proceedings are
brought against the property owner and operate to forfeit any property acquired by
illegal means. See id. at 1487 n.5 (citing Michael Goldsmith & MarkJay Linderman,
Asset Forfeiture & Third Party Rights: The Need for FurtherLaw Reform, 1989 DuKE L.J.
1254, 1260).
16 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-83 (1974).
Colonies, before the adoption of the Constitution, and states, under the Articles of
Confederation, enforced English as well as local in rem forfeiture provisions. See id.
at 683 (citing CJ. Henry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943)). This English influence was most strongly reflected in American customs and admiralty law. See id.
The English influence, however, did have its limitations. See id. at 682-83. For
example, deodands never found a place in the American common-law tradition of
civil forfeiture. See id. Furthermore, the forfeiture of estates belonging to traitors
was proscribed by the Supreme Court if such forfeiture was not limited to the lifetime of the traitor. See id. at 683 (citing Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202

(1876)).

16 SeeThe Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1827); see also infra notes 52-55
and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of The Palmyra). "The
thing is ... primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence [sic] is attached primarily to the thing...." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14; see also Sandra
Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture,
81 CoRNj.L L. REv. 343, 362 & n.87 (1996) (discussing the rejection of the innocent owner defense by early American courts).
17 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (upholding state forfeiture of a jointly-owned vehicle despite the fact that one joint-owner was completely unaware of the other owner's illegal use of the car); Dobbin's Distillery v.
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In a 1996 decision, Bennis v. Michigan," the United States Supreme Court addressed the concept of an innocent owner defense
within the context of determining the constitutionality of a state's
abatement scheme.'
Specifically, the Court held that an owner's
property interest may be civilly forfeited if the property is used to
commit an illegal act even if the illegal use is unbeknownst to the
owner. 0 The Court also commented that an owner is not entitled to
compensation from the government when a property interest is
civilly forfeited.'
On the night of October 3, 1988,John Bennis drove home from
work in a 1977 Pontiac automobile. 22 The automobile was jointly
owned by he and his wife, Tina Bennis.2" Mr. Bennis parked his car
next to a young woman who was "flagging"2' passing vehicles." At
that time, two Detroit police officers working undercover for the vice
squad turned their attention to Mr. Bennis and the young woman.2
United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877) (finding that owner and lessor of distillery
illegally used by tenant/lessee could not assert his lack of knowledge of lessee's illegal conduct to rebut forfeiture of the property); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233, 234 (1844) (holding that a property owner's innocence
is irrelevant when conducting an in rem analysis); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15
(holding that a ship owner cannot use his innocence as a defense against the government-imposed forfeiture of his ship); United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera
Automobile, 560 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's automobile that was used by the owner's son to transport marijuana); United States v. One 26 1/2 Oz. Full Bottle of Lawson's Scotch Whiskey, 17
F. Supp. 975, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1936) (declaring that innocent owner defense was not
available to purchaser of untaxed bottle of whiskey).
is 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
19 See id. at 997-98.
20 See id. at
998.
21 See id. at 1001.
See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Att'y v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d
483, 488-89 (Mich. 1994), affd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). Mr. Bennis admitted during
trial that he usually proceeded home on Eight Mile and turned north onto Woodward. See id. On the evening in question, however, Bennis turned south onto Sheffield, which is in the opposite direction of his home. See id. Testimony at trial
clearly indicated that this area of the city was infamous for its numerous solicitation
incidents and high records of arrests for prostitution. See id. at 491. The Michigan
Supreme Court went as far as stating that the neighborhood had "a reputation for
illicit activity." Id. at 486.
2

See id.

See id. "Flagging" is a term used by law enforcement authorities to describe
the method by which prostitutes attract potential customers. See id. at n.2.
25 See id. at 486. The police knew the prostitute servicing Mr. Bennis
because
they had arrested her on several prior occasions for solicitation and obscene conduct. See id. at n.3. The testimony of one witness, a local security guard, indicated
that Bennis had spoken with prostitutes on two prior occasions during the summer
of 1987 but had not invited them into his automobile. See id. at 488.
See id. at 486. One of the officers testified that it was common knowledge
24
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The young woman entered the 1977 Pontiac on the passenger's
side.2 Mr. Bennis then proceeded down the street, parked the
automobile, and turned off the headlights." The two officers followed Mr. Bennis and parked behind his automobile." After the officers observed the young woman's head disappear toward the
driver's side of the 1977 Pontiac, they approached the vehicle and1
witnessed the young woman performing fellatio" on Mr. Bennis.3
Mr. Bennis was then charged with, and subsequently convicted of,
gross indecency. 2
Following Mr. Bennis's conviction, the State filed a complaint
against both he and his wife alleging that their 1977 Pontiac was a
"public nuisance"" and was therefore subject to abatement." Mrs.
among law enforcement officials that the young woman was a prostitute. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Att'y v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 737-38
(Mich. CL App. 1993) (Jansen,J., dissenting).
V' See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
28 See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 737
(JansenJ, dissenting).
29

Seeid.

so See BLACK'S LAwDicnoNmi 616 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fellatio as "[a] sexual act in which the mouth or lips come into contact with the penis.").
1 See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d
at 486.
32 See id. There was no evidence presented at trial that
indicated that Mr. Bennis
paid for the prostitute's services. See id. at 488. Mr. Bennis was charged with and
convicted of lewdness. See id. at 486, 488. This statute provides in pertinent part:
"Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency with a female person shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable as provided in this section."
S3 See MCH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 600.3801 (West
1991). The Michigan State Legislature defined a pubic nuisance as follows:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of
lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept
for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons... is hereby declared a nuisance ... and all.., nuisances shall be enjoined and
abated as herein provided, and as provided in the court rules. Any
person, or his servant, agent, or employee who shall own, lease, conduct, or maintain any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the
purposes or any of the persons above set forth or where any of the acts
above enumerated are conducted, permitted or carried on, is guilty of
a nuisance.
Id.
'
See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732; see also BLACK's LAW DIcnoNARY 4 (6th ed.
1990) (defining abatement as "[a] reduction, a decrease, or a diminution. The suspension or cessation, in whole or in part, of a continuing charge, such as rent.").
The Michigan Legislature promulgated § 600.3825, which states in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement
shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order
shall direct the removal from the building or place of all furniture,
fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the
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Bennis defended her property interest in the automobile by arguing
that she had no knowledge that her husband would use the car in
violation of Michigan's indecency laws." The Wayne County Circuit
Court rejected this argument, held that the 1977 Pontiac was a public nuisance, and ordered its abatement."
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals, with one dissent, reversed the decision on three grounds."' First, the court held that,
notwithstanding the express language of the statute, Michigan common law required the government to prove that Mrs. Bennis possessed knowledge of the illicit act performed in the vehicle.'" Second, the court declared that the automobile could not be considered
a nuisance because only one alleged incident of lewdness, assigna-

manner provided for in the sale of chattels under execution ....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to
be a nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the
same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as
herein provided.
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon
the sale of any furniture, fixtures, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as
provided in this section, the officer executing the order or the court
shall, after deducting the expenses of keeping such property and costs
of such sale, pay all liens according to their priorities... and shall pay
the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of
the state.
MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. § 600.3825 (West 1996).
See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996). The Supreme Court reviewed the trial judge's decision that the court had the authority to reimburse "the
innocent co-tide owner" with one-half of the sale proceeds minus expenses. See id.
The Supreme Court noted, however, that the judge refused to award reimbursement in this case because the costs associated with selling the vehicle virtually
amounted to the $600 value of the 1977 Pontiac. See id.
s1 See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732-35.
See id. at 733. The court first noted that the express language of the statute
stated that "'[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of
the defendants or any of them, is not required.'" Id. (quoting MIcH. CoMp. LAws
ANN. § 600.3815 (West 1996)). The court, however, observed that the Michigan
Supreme Court in People v. &hoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456, 457 (Mich. 1927) would not
uphold an abatement scheme absent proof of the owner's knowledge of the illicit
act. See id. The court also referred to State ex reL Patterson v. Motorama Motel Cotp.,
307 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 733. The
Motorama court held that "knowledge, consent or acquiescence by the owner or operator of an alleged public nuisance are necessary elements for abatement." Motorama Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d at 351-52. The court distinguished and dismissed
earlier decisions that held that the forfeiture statute required actual knowledge of
the illegal acts by declaring that Schoonmaker had not been overruled. See Bennis,
504 N.W.2d at 733 (discussing State ex reL Brucker v. Robinson, 229 N.W. 403, 405
(Mich. 1930) and People ex reL Dowlingv. Bitonti, 10 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Mich. 1943)).
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don, or prostitution was charged.9 According to the court's interpretation of the Michigan statute, one incident did not amount to a
nuisance.4 Third, the court of appeals held that the State failed to
prove that an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution had actually occurred in the 1977 Pontiac.
The Supreme Court of Michigan granted leave to appeal and
reversed the decision on all grounds.4 The court first declared that
an act of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution clearly took place in
the vehicle on the evening of October 3, 1988.4 Furthermore, the
majority concluded that one instance of lewdness could create an
abatable public nuisance." Then, despite the existence of a Michigan Supreme Court case to the contrary, 4 the Bennis court found
that the Michigan statutory scheme unambiguously stated that an
owner's knowledge of the property's use is not required to make the
property abatable.4" Finally, the court held that the Michigan abatement scheme was constitutional.47
39See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 733
See id.
See id. at 735. Due to the absence of evidence that Mr. Bennis paid for the
prostitute's services, the majority reasoned that no proof existed that Mr. Bennis
engaged in an activity prohibited by the statute. See id.
See Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 487 (Mich. 1994).
See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486. The court stated that proof of a monetary exchange was not necessary to find that an act of lewdness had occurred given the circumstances listed in the record. See id. at 488. These circumstances included (1)
the neighborhood's reputation as an area where illicit activities took place, (2) the
prostitute's record or prior arrests for solicitation, and (3) the officer's testimony
that the prostitute was engaged in the act of fellatio. See id. The court concluded
that these circumstances substantiated the prostitution charge. See id. at 489; see also
State ex reL Macomb County Prosecuting Att'y v. H.C. Mesk, 333 N.W.2d 184, 188
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the term "prostitution" for purposes of Michigan's abatement scheme includes the "manual stimulation of another person for
the payment of money. .. ").
See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 492. But see H.C. Mesh, 333 N.W.2d at 190-91
(stating that the court need not determine the number of occurrences when finding that an illicit act is a continuing nuisance, but commenting that the rate of such
occurrences may be dispositive).
45 See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 493 (citing People v. Schoonmaker,
216 N.W. 456,
457 (Mich. 1927)); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the
Michigan Court of Appeals's holding that state common law prohibited the forfeiture of the Bennis automobile).
46 See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 493. Other jurisdictions have expressly upheld civil
forfeiture schemes, like the Michigan scheme at issue, under very similar circumstances. See, e.g., In re 1976 Blue Ford Pickup, 586 P.2d 993, 994-96 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that when ajoint tenant acts like a sole owner while engaging in
illegal conduct forfeiture of the joindy held property does not violate the innocent
owner's due process rights); People v. Garner, 732 P.2d 1194, 1196, 1198-99 (Colo.
1987) (upholding the application of civil forfeiture to an automobile co-owned by
40
41
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Following the Michigan Supreme Court's resolution of the case,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that Michigan's
abatement scheme did not dispossess Mrs. Bennis's property interest
in the automobile without due process of law." In reaching that
conclusion, the Court stated that a lack of knowledge concerning the
illegal use of property provided no defense to abatement.' Based on
this reasoning, the majority held that the State need not compensate
the owner of such abated property."
In the seminal case of The Palmyra,5 2 the United States Supreme
Court recognized the difference between a proceeding in personam
and a proceeding in rem. " In The Palmyra, the owner of the ship
contended that he must be convicted in an in personam proceeding
before his ship could be forfeited in an in rem proceeding." Justice
an innocent wife when her husband used the automobile illegally to transport controlled substances).
4
See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 495. To reach its conclusion, the court reasoned
that "the property subject to forfeiture was the evil sought to be remedied." Id. at
493-94.
SeeBennis v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 2275 (1995).
4
See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. CL 994, 997-98 (1996). Due process of law is
defined as "an exercise of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of
law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual
rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question
belongs." BLACK's LAwDICnoNARY 500 (6th ed. 1990).
50 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998. The ChiefJustice elaborated this proposition
by
stating that "a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in
property may be forfeited by reason of use to which the property is put even though
the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use." Id.
1 See id. at 1001. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973), and United States v. Rands, 389 U.S.
121, 125 (1967), for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
does not require that the government compensate an owner for property that is
gained through powers other than the eminent domain power. See Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 1001.
5225 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
Iss See id. at 14-15; see also supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (explaining
the difference between in rem and in personam forfeiture proceedings). The
Palmyra was a privateer ship commissioned by the King of Spain. See The Palmyra,
25 U.S. at 8. The ship was captured by a United States war vessel and brought to
Charleston, South Carolina, to face adjudication on charges of piracy. See id. The
District Court of South Carolina acquitted the ship without rewarding damages to
the owner. See id. Both sides appealed and the Circuit Court of South Carolina upheld the acquittal but rewarded damages to the owner in the amount of $10,288.58.
See id. at 8-9. Both sides then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See id.
at 9.
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 12; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text
(defining in rem forfeiture). The respondent ship owner further argued that the
charge against the ship was defective because it failed to list specially particular acts
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Story, writing for an unanimous Court, disagreed and declared that
in personam and in rem proceedings are not dependent upon each
other.
In United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, a similar admiralty forfeiture
case decided seventeen years later, Justice Story reaffirmed the rule
established in The Palmyra.' The owner of the Brig Malek Adhel alleged that his innocence and lack of knowledge regarding the illegal
acts' of the ship's captain and its crew should prevent the forfeiture
of his ship." The Supreme Court proclaimed that the vessel itself
was the offender and, therefore, the innocence or lack of knowledge
of the owner provided no defense to the forfeiture action.6 The
of piracy. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 7. Lastly, the ship owner contended that the
United States lacked sufficient probable cause to subdue and adjudicate the ship.
See id.
See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15. The rhetoric of this classic opinion captures
the essence of the Palmyra Court's argument:

The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
But the practice has
offense is attached primarily to the thing ....
been, and so this Court understand [sic] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any
criminal proceeding in personam.... In the judgment of this Court,
no personal conviction of the offender is necessary to enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature.
Id.
The Court held that probable cause existed to subdue the ship and reversed
the award of damages. See id. at 18. The majority did affirm, however, the circuit
court's order of the ship's restitution to her owner. See id.
56
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
57 See id. at 234. The United States captured and brought the Malek
Adhel to
Baltimore, Maryland, where it faced adjudication of "piratical aggression and restraint on the high seas." Id. at 229. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the ship guilty but acquitted the ship's cargo. See id. The
ship owner and the United States appealed, and the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Maryland reaffirmed the district court decision. See id. at
229-30. Both parties then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at
230.
W See id. at 230 (noting that the ship carried a cannon, pistols, and daggers in
violation of the commercial law of the time).
9 See id. at 221-22. The owner's innocence and lack of knowledge was clearly
noted in the record. See id. at 221. The owner of the ship used these facts to argue
that the ship was neither liable in personam nor in rem, and thus, the ship and its
caro should not be forfeited. See id. at 222.
See id. at 233. To illustrate the point, the Court quoted from United States v.
Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612) where thenjudge Marshall asserted:
This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against
the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel; which is not the less
an offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture because it
was committed without the authority and against the will of the owner.
It is true that inanimate matter can commit no offense. But this body
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Court concluded by holding that the ship, but not its cargo, could be
subjected to forfeiture."1
The rule articulated in these admiralty cases-that the vessel itself is brought up on charges in an in rem proceeding and the guilt
or innocence of its owner is legally insignificant-extended beyond
admiralty proceedings with the Supreme Court's decision in Dobbin's
Distillery v. United States.62 In Dobbin's, the owner of a spirits distillery
forfeited both real and personal property to the federal government
after the lessee of the property violated a United States revenue statute." Like the ship owners' defenses in the admiralty cases, the lessor and owner of the distillery claimed that he had no knowledge of
the lessee's illegal conduct." The Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the civil forfeiture resulted from an in rem proceeding
brought against the real and personal property of the distillery, and

is animated and put in action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts and speaks by the master. She reports herself by
the master. It is therefore not unreasonable that the vessel should be
affected by this report.
Id. at 234 (quoting The Little Charles,26 F. Cas. at 982).
Justice Story applied this rule and held that the owner's guilt or innocence is
not a factor when determining whether the property should be forfeited on account
of illegal activities committed by agents of the property owner. See id.
61 See id. at 238. Affirming the decision of the circuit court, Justice Story noted
that forfeiture of the cargo, as well as the ship, would violate a well-established admiralty principle that exempts cargo from similar forfeiture actions. See id. at 237.
62 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
But see Donald J. Boudreaux & A. C. Pritchard, Innocence
Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition,61 Mo. L. Rev. 593, 622 (1996)
(stating that Dobbin'sDistileryfails to cite precedent supporting the legal theory that
in rem forfeiture is applicable outside the realms of customs and admiralty proceedings).
See Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 396. The acts perpetrated by the lessee that led to the
forfeiture at issue primarily dealt with infractions of federal revenue provisions pursuant to 15 Stat. 125, 132-33 § 19 (1868). See id. The statute prohibited acts of negligence in bookkeeping and required proper maintenance of revenue books. See
id.; see also 15 Stat. at 132-33 § 19. The lessee committed negligence and failed to
maintain proper revenue books by creating false entries with the intent to defraud
the government. See Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 396. The lessee also refused to produce
these books when a request was filed by revenue officers. See id.
Ajury verdict entered in favor of the federal government resulted from the in
rem proceeding against the lessor's property conducted by the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Iowa. See id. at 395, 397. The lessor and owner of
the distillery sued pursuant to a writ of error, and the cause was removed to the
United States Supreme Court. See id. at 397.
See Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 397. The innocent owner's writ of error argued that
the trial court erred when charging the jury that the claimant's lack of knowledge
was unnecessary in finding for the government. See id.
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not against the property's owner.6 Therefore, the innocence or guilt
of the lessor and owner was irrelevant to the in rem proceeding."
The evolution of civil forfeiture law jurisprudence continued in
J.W.Goldsmith,Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States.67 In JW Goldsmith, a car
dealership maintained that in rem forfeiture under the Internal
Revenue Act violated the Constitution." The car dealership forfeited
See id. at 399; see also The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. at 982 (stating that an in rem
proceeding is "a proceeding against the vessel, for an offence committed by the
vessel, which is not less an offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture,
because it was committed without the authority, and against the will of the owner.");
supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text (discussing the historical roots of civil forfeiture as an in rem proceeding).
In effect, the Supreme Court's holding in Dobbin'sdenoted that the illegal acts
of a lessee will bind the lessor no matter how innocent or unknowing he may be.
See Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 404. The Justice's reasoning may seem a bit harsh, but a
strict reading of the revenue statute mandates this interpretation. See Hewitt, supra
note 4, at 331 n.55 (stating that the Court in Dobbin's strictly adhered to the text of
the federal revenue statute in affirming the trial court's holding of civil forfeiture);

see also United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 405 (1814)
(declaring that "[iun the eternal struggle that exists between avarice... [and] enterprize... on the one hand, and the power charged with the administration of the
laws on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to
carry into effect the measures of policy adopted by the legislature."); c.David F. B.
Smith, Mortgage Lenders Beware: The Threat to Real Estate FinancingCaused by Flawed
Protectionfor Mortgage Lenders in Federal Forfeiture Actions Involving Real Proper, 25
REAL. PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 481, 485 (1990) (discussing the problems resulting from
the application of traditional civil forfeiture law to innocent and unknowing mortgage lenders when real property is illegally used).
The Court in Dobbin's failed to cite any precedent justifying the extension of
civil forfeiture proceedings to circumstances outside the admiralty and customs areas of law. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 622. Several cases decided
during the Dobbin's era of forfeiture jurisprudence held that an in rem forfeiture
proceeding under similar circumstances was an improper penalty imposed on an
owner of property. See id. at 623. Moreover, mid-nineteenth century state courts
vigilantly policed the boundaries of forfeiture as a criminal penalty and refused to
impose forfeiture as a civil penalty pursuant to in rem proceedings. See id.
See Dobbin's, 96 U.S. at 399.
67

254 U.S. 505 (1921).

See id. at 508-09. The federal revenue statute at issue provided:
Whenever any goods or commodities for or in respect whereof any tax
is or shall be imposed.... are removed, or are deposited or concealed
in any place, with intent to defraud the United States of such tax, or
any part thereof, all such goods and commodities,... shall be forfeited; and in every such case all the casks, vessels, cases, or other
packages whatsoever, containing, or which shall have contained, such
goods or commodities, respectively, and every vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatsoever, and all horses or other animals, and all things used in the removal or for the deposit or concealment thereof, respectively, shall be forfeited.
Id. at 508 (quoting Act ofJuly 13, 1866, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 151 codified as § 3450
Revised Statutes).
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its security interest in an automobile after the vehicle was used to
transport untaxed distilled spirits."9 Determining that Congress intended to sacrifice innocent owner defenses in favor of protecting
revenue sources,70 the Court upheld the in rem forfeiture." The
Pursuant to this statute, the petitioner's interest in a Hudson automobile, valued at $800, was seized after three perpetrators used the automobile to remove, deposit, and conceal 58 gallons of untaxed spirits. See id.; see also United States v. One
Chevrolet 1935 Sedan, 12 F. Supp. 793, 796-97 (W.D.N.Y. 1935) (noting that the
National Prohibition Act protected innocent automobile owners but that § 3450 of
the Internal Revenue Act did not); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 627
(stating that federal prosecutors were deferential in bringing forfeiture cases involving the illegal transportation of untaxed liquor under § 3450 of the Internal Revenue Act because, unlike the National Prohibition Act, § 3450 did not offer an innocent owner defense). Despite this apparent conflict, courts have overwhelmingly
held that the National Prohibition Act did not provide inapposite results with §
3450 in forfeiture cases involving the illegal transportation of alcohol. See United
States v, One Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 334-35 (1926) (holding that the National Prohibition Act, as applied to the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property,
did not impliedly repeal § 3450); see also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
United States, 286 U.S. 49, 61 (1932) (differentiating between the National Prohibition Act and the forfeiture provisions of federal customs law).
The case of United States v. One Cheurolit Automobile, 21 F.2d 477 (M.D. Ala.

1927), suggests an interesting caveat. Like the factual circumstances of JW Goldsmith, an innocent third-party car dealership had one of its automobiles forfeited
after an authorized party used the automobile illegally to transport alcohol. See id.
at 478. The court held that, notwithstanding that the federal government brought
the action against the defendant's automobile pursuant to § 3450 of the Internal
Revenue Act, the defendant was nonetheless afforded the innocent owner defense
under the National Prohibition Act. See id. at 479. The court reasoned that failure
to pay the tax specified under the statute was incidental to the illegal transportation
and possession of alcoholic beverages. See id. The court deferred to the prohibition
agents' testimony that they confiscated the automobile while acting pursuant to the
prohibition law rather than the tax law. See id. at 478. Thus, the holdings of prohibition-era cases like One Chevrolet andjW Goldsmith turned on a fact-sensitive analysis. See, e.g., One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. at 325 (stating that a prohibition director may
nonetheless invoke a § 3450 forfeiture action against the property of an innocent
owner); United States v. One Graham Paige Sedan, 38 F.2d 848, 849 (E.D.N.Y.
1930) (stating that the federal government may not bar the invocation of the innocent owner defense by proceeding under § 3450 in cases where perpetrators have
been arrested under the National Prohibition Act).
Seer W Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 508.
70 See id. at 510. Writing for the majority,
Justice McKenna concluded:
Congress must have taken into account the necessities of the Government, its revenues and policies, and was faced with the necessity of
making provision against their violation or evasion and the ways and
means of violation or evasion. In breaches of revenue provisions some
forms of property are facilities, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes the care and responsibility of their owners in aid of
the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to
the property a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in
the wrong.
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Court declined to address, however, whether the legal rationale of
the holding might be extended7'
Five years later, in Van Oster v. Kansas,' the United States SuW 4 Van
preme Court reaffirmed the rule established inJW Goldsmith.'
Oster involved the forfeiture and sale of an automobile pursuant to
state nuisance law after an authorized user operated it illegally by
The Supreme Court previously made a similar interpretation of a federal liquor
tax statute when it found that "statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore... they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature." United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12 (1889).
With the passage in 1933 of the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the
Prohibition Amendment to the United States Constitution, Congress sought to alleviate the harshness imposed on innocent owners by the Internal Revenue Act. See
United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 221
(1939). Accordingly, Congress drafted the Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement
Act Title 27 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. See id.; see also One Chevrolet 1935 Sedan, 12 F. Supp.
at 797 (declaring that the Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act provided for the
protection of innocent property owners after forfeiture had been declared, by detailing the proceedings that may be taken in lieu of forfeiture); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 627 n.198 (arguing that passage of the Twenty-First
Amendment caused the Supreme Court to withdraw some of "the rather daunting
monitoring duties it had imposed on creditors" under the Eighteenth Amendment).
71 Se-eJW Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511, 513; see also United States v. Eliott
Hall
Farm, 42 F. Supp. 235, 238 (D.N.J. 1941) (holding that in rem civil forfeiture made
pursuant to statute did not depend on the property owner's guilt or innocence as
established in a separate criminal proceeding); United States v. One 26 1/2 Oz.
Full Bottle of Lawson's Scotch Whiskey, 17 F. Supp. 975, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1936)
(stating that innocence is immaterial in civil forfeiture cases).
SeeJW Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 512. The Court made two express reservations.
See id. First, the majority refused to determine whether the present law may be extended. See id. For example, the Court declined to discuss the likelihood of forfeiture of a Pullman railway sleeper car when a passenger carries an illegal bottle of
liquor on board the car. See id. The Court also declined to address the possible forfeiture consequences of an ocean steamer when the ship unknowingly receives and
transports contraband. See id. Next, the Court reserved its opinion as to whether
§ 3450 of the Internal Revenue Act should "be extended to property stolen from the
owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent." Id. Instead, the
Court stated that its holding would be limited to the facts before it, and that any extension of the holding would be considered on a case by case analysis. See id.; see
also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (noting that "more recent
cases have expressly reserved the question whether the legal fiction [that the property, itself, is guilty of the illegal conduct] could be employed to forfeit the property
of a truly innocent owner."). But see Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 999 n.5
(1996) (rejecting the broad reading ofJW Goldsmith's second reservation).
272 U.S. 465 (1926).
7 See id. at 468; see also Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (stating that the Supreme Court
relied on its holding in JW Goldsmith to formulate its ruling in Van Oster); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supranote 62, at 629 (commenting that the Supreme Court in
Van Osterapplied the holding ofJ.W Goldsmith).
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transporting liquor without the automobile owner's knowledge or
consent."' The Court began its opinion by expressly recognizing traditional state police power' to forfeit property used in furtherance of
75 See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466. Van Oster purchased
an automobile from a
dealership with the agreement that the vendors could retain use of it for business
purposes. See id. An associate of the car dealership used the automobile illegally to
transport intoxicating liquor. See id. On one of these occasions, the associate was
arrested for the illegal transportation of contraband pursuant to 1919 KA. SEss.
LAws §§ 1-5, 21-2162 to 21-2167. See id. The petitioner's automobile was subsequendy forfeited and sold as a common nuisance under this same statute. See id.
The state court of Kansas upheld the forfeiture notwithstanding Van Oster's claim
that he was an innocent owner and therefore the automobile should not be subject
to forfeiture. See id. The associate of the car dealership was later acquitted, but the
automobile remained forfeited. See id.
Van Oster presented three arguments to the United States Supreme Court in
support of his contention that the car's forfeiture was unconstitutional. See id. at
466-67. First, Van Oster claimed that the Kansas statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 466. Second, Van Oster argued that
the use of the state statute was precluded by the National Prohibition Act, which
adequately covered forfeiture cases pursuant to the illegal transportation of alcohol.
See id. at 466-67; see also supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (explaining why
the National Prohibition Act would have offered Van Oster an innocent owner defense). Third, Van Oster contended that the arrest and subsequent acquittal of the
arrested associate did not trigger the Kansas forfeiture scheme. See Van Oster, 272
U.S. at 467.
As to Van Oster's third claim, the United States Supreme Court dismissed it as
a matter of state procedure and declared that the state court decision controlled.
See id. at 469. The Court reasoned that there was no "tenable ground" for supporting a constitutional argument based on the associate's acquittal. See id.
Prior to Van Oster, the Supreme Court had held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee a citizen any particular form of state procedure as long as
the state satisfied general notice requirements and provided an opportunity to be
heard. See, e.g., Missouri ex reL Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40, 41-42 (1926) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not entitle doctors brought before the state
board of health the absolute right to subpoena witnesses); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (positing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require a grand jury indictment before the state prosecutes a
defendant for murder); Kennard v. Louisiana ex re. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 481
(1875) (stating that "[i]rregularities and mere errors in [state court] proceedings
can only be corrected in the State courts. Our authority does not extend beyond an
examination of the power of the courts below to proceed at all.").
11 See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
A state's traditional police
power includes:
[Elverything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to
justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of
whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance ....Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it,
and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
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illegal liquor traffic." The Supreme Court ultimately found no valid
distinction between applying the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to a state's regulatory power of domestic affairs and the
application of8 the Fifth Amendment to federal exercises of the tax-

ing authority.

In Calkro-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,79 the United States
Supreme Court returned to its traditional admiralty analysis of forfeiture proceedings and reconsidered the question of an innocent

See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467. In Van Oster the Supreme Court extended the
use of civil forfeiture proceedings for punitive purposes to state governments. See
Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 629. The Van Oster Court noted that the
State of Kansas operated under the auspices of traditional state police powers to
suppress the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor by declaring the instrumentality a common nuisance and subjecting it to forfeiture. See Van Oster, 272 U.S.
at 466.
The Supreme Court has extended the use of state police power to encompass a
wide range of scenarios. See, e.g., Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136 (stating that state police
power extends to "the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with contagious
diseases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression
of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold."); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S.
1, 16 (1888) (holding that a statute that inflicts penalties for the manufacture and
sale of liquor and provides for the abatement of the property used for such prohibited purposes is a valid exercise of state police power under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887) (holding same). But see
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 468, 469, 471 (1877) (holding that a Missouri
statute prohibiting the driving of out-of-state cattle into its borders violates the
Commerce Clause and is an illegitimate exercise of state police power); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276, 281 (1875) (holding that a California statute that forbade the immigration of "lewd and debauched women" was an unconstitutional use
of state police power that infringed on individuals' rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
7s See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468; see also Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325
(1903) (noting that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment... legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbitrary
state legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is offered by the Fifth
Amendment against similar legislation by Congress ... ."). Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stone noted that "certain uses of property may be regarded as
so undesirable that," when an owner relinquishes control of the property and the
property is subsequently used for an undesirable purpose, the owner surrenders
control of the property at his own peril. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467. The Court
emphasized this rationale by stating that Van Oster had voluntarily entrusted the
offender with the use of his automobile. See id.; cf Logan v. United States, 260 F.
746, 747, 749 (5th Cir. 1919) (upholding the forfeiture of an automobile and a
mule entrusted by their owners for use by revenue law offenders notwithstanding

the owners' lack of knowledge concerning the tax violations); United States v. Mincey, 254 F. 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1918) (holding that property entrusted by an owner to
an employee for the item's lawful use is nonetheless subject to civil forfeiture if the

employee deceptively uses the property for unlawful purposes).
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
g
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owner's defense.' Although respondent, a lessor of pleasure yachts,
knew nothing of the illegal activity that took place aboard one of its
ships,81 the yacht nonetheless was forfeited under Puerto Rican law
after lessees used it to transport controlled substances."" The United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found the Puerto
Rican law unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the case."
so See id. at 664; Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 619 (discussing how
the Calero-Toledo opinion marked a return to the traditional domain of civil forfeiture in admiralty cases).
81 See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 619 (noting that the ship illegall transported marijuana).
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665. In March 1971, the Pearson Yacht Leasing
Company rented a yacht to two Puerto Rican residents. See id. The lessees were
subsequently arrested by Puerto Rican authorities for transporting marijuana
aboard the leased yacht. See id. As far as the Supreme Court could discover, there
was only one marijuana cigarette found on board. See id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The seizure and forfeiture of the yacht was made pursuant to the Controlled
Substances Act of Puerto Rico, which does not offer an innocent owner defense. See
id. at 665. The statute states in relevant part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured,
distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this chapter
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in
any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in clauses (1)
[which includes marijuana] and (2) of this subsection ....
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a)(1)&(4) (1980). On the other hand, the Puerto
Rican statute's federal counterpart, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, expressly provides an innocent owner defense by noting that
.no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest
of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have
been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of
the owner." 21 U.S.C. §881(a) (4) (C) (1988).
After the arrest of the lessees, the Puerto Rican government seized the yacht
without notifying the lessor. See Cakro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 667. Shortly after taking
custody of the boat, the government gave the lessee notice of the ship's seizure but
it failed to notify Pearson. See id. at 667-68. Thus, by the time the respondent discovered that one of its yachts had been seized, the forfeiture action had already
commenced. See id.
a See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (D.P.R.
1973), revd sub nom Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974). In Pearson, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
held that forfeiture of the plaintiffs yacht was an unconstitutional exercise of the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See id. at 1342. Noting the Pearson Company's
status as an innocent owner, the court reasoned that the forfeiture blatantly deprived Pearson of its property without just compensation. See id. The court based
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The United States Supreme Court overruled the district court
and upheld the Puerto Rican forfeiture scheme." The Supreme
Court based its holding on the well-established common-law principle that an innocent owner is not necessarily protected from the civil
forfeiture of her property." In dictum, the Court suggested two possible scenarios where an innocent owner defense could present an
exception to the well-established rule of forfeiture." The first sceits opinion on its interpretation of United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715 (1971). See Pearson, 363 F. Supp. at 1341. In United States Coin & Currency,
the Supreme Court stated in dictum that a broadly sweeping forfeiture statute
might be difficult to reconcile with the due process- and just compensation requirements of the Fifth Amendment. See id. (citing United States Coin Y Currency,
401 U.S. at 720-21).
" See Calro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680, 690. In reversing the district court's
holding, the Supreme Court opined that the lower court had seriously misconstrued
United States Coin & Currency. See id. at 688. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan first noted that the Court in United States Coin & Currency did not overrule prior
case law insofar as the applicability of forfeiture to innocent owners. See id. at 664,
680. Justice Brennan further noted that the majority in United States Coin & Currency limited its holding to the notion that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination could be asserted by a claimant in a federal revenue forfeiture
proceeding as a complete defense when the property at issue was derived from illegal gambling activities. See id. at 688 (citing United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
at 719-21). The Supreme Court coupled the fact that the prior case law had not
been overturned with the assertion that Puerto Rico enacted its forfeiture scheme
pursuant to the state's police power to protect a legitimate public interest and upheld the forfeiture of Pearson's yacht. See id.; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of the state police power and legitimate governmental interests notions to the forfeiture analysis under the Constitution).
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683-86. Justice Brennan rooted the Puerto
Rican
forfeiture scheme's constitutional legitimacy in criminal law's traditional goals of
punishment and deterrence. See id. at 686; see also supra note 76 and accompanying
text (discussing the state police power and its function of ensuring the health and
safety of state citizens). The Court stated that the forfeiture of such property prevents future illegal uses of the property because the economic penalties render the
illegal behavior unprofitable. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687; see also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972) (reasoning
that the forfeiture of property serves a remedial function of reimbursing governments for their investigatory and enforcement exercises). Lastly, the majority explained that forfeiture provisions place great incentives on innocent lessors, secured
creditors, and other owners to practice optimal care in entrusting the use of their
progerty to third parties. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90; Hewitt, supra note 4, at 341 (stating that
the enunciation of these limiting circumstances were not part of the Calkro-Toledo
holding and operated solely as dicta); O'Brien, supra note 1, at 546 (collectively
deeming both of these exceptions the Calero-Toledo defense).
As to the first circumstance of the Calro-Toledo defense,Justice Brennan stated:
"It... would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent."
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689; see also United States v. One Ford Coupe Auto., 272
U.S. 321, 333 (1926) (holding by implication that civil forfeiture of an innocent
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nario, according to the Court, occurs when an owner's property is
forfeited despite an absence of privity or consent." The second
situation, the Court mentioned, occurs when an owner proves that
he did all that could be reasonably expected to prevent the illicit use
of the property.88
The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of forfeiture in
Bennis v. Michigan." In Bennis, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property under a state statutory scheme violated the Constitution." ChiefJustice
owner's automobile pursuant to § 3450 would be unfounded if a thief used the
automobile illegally to transport intoxicating liquor). In regard to the second circumstance, the Justice declared that "the same might be said of an owner who
proved... that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property." Caero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.

The majority concluded that neither of these exceptions applied because the
Pearson Company voluntarily entrusted the yacht to the lessees and no evidence
suggested that the Company acted to prevent the unlawful use of the yacht. See id.
at 690. The Court made this determination notwithstanding the Puerto Rican Government's concession that the Pearson Company lacked any knowledge of the lessee's illegal acts. See id. at 668. That concession, along with the Pearson Company's
standard illegality clause in its leasing contracts, seemed to question the majority's
nonapplication of either defense. See id. at 693 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
Regardless of the apparent unfairness of the ultimate holding, the recognition
of the C41ero-Toledo defense designated a jurisprudential floor below which the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property would be unconstitutional. See O'Brien, supra note 1, at 546. In fact, after Caero-Toedowas decided, lower courts spilt on the

applicability of the Caero-Toledodefense to federal forfeiture statutes. See id. at 54445 (noting that lower courts disagreed as to whether the Calero-Toledo defense applied in a 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) forfeiture action of real property). Even if a court
adopted the defense, the innocent owner still carried the heavy burden of proving
she had done all she could reasonably do to prevent the proscribed use of the
property at issue. See Hewitt, supra note 4, at 342. See, e.g., United States v. 755 Forest Road, 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that willful blindness to her husband's narcotics sales did not exempt a wife's property from forfeiture); United
States v. M/V Mologa, 876 F.2d 884, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the
Calero-Toledo defense did not apply because claimant failed to take reasonable actions that would ensure that the third party taking possession of the claimant's ship
would not use the ship illegally to smuggle drugs); United States v. One 1973 Buick
Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that the Caero-Toledo defense did not apply to the forfeiture of claimant's automobile because he knew of
his son's narcotics history and he allowed his son unrestricted use of the automobile); United States v. One 1980 Cadillac Eldorado, 603 F. Supp. 853, 857 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that claimant did not do all she could reasonably do to prevent the
forfeiture of her automobile because she had notice of her husband's prior narcotics convictions).
See Caero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 (commenting that an owner must be uninvolved with and unaware of the wrongful activity).
a See id. at 689-90.
ag 116 S. Ct. 994, 997-98 (1996).
W See id. at 996. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Michigan State abatement scheme violated the Due Process

1280

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 28:1262

Rehnquist, writing for the majority, thoroughly outlined the historical evolution of civil in rem forfeiture.9' The Chief Justice traced in
rem forfeiture jurisprudence from early nineteenth-century Supreme
Court cases to late twentieth-century holdings.9 Relying on extensive
precedent allowing forfeiture of property used in illegal activities despite the owner's ignorance of the activity, the Supreme Court, in a
five to four decision, upheld the Michigan forfeiture scheme. 3 Additionally, the majority noted that Michigan's statute did not violate
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause."
The Supreme Court began by discussing the due process argument 5 with an examination of the holdings and rationales of The
Palmyra, Brig Malek Adhel, Dobbin's Distillery, Van Oster, and the JW
Goldsmith cases.9 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the J.W GoldClause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 997-98.
91 See id.at 998-1000.
See id. at 998-99. ChiefJustice Rehnquist first addressed the petitioner's due
process argument under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 998. The crux of
the petitioner's claim regarded substantive due process issues. See id. Tina Bennis
contended that she should have been allowed to invoke the "innocent owner" defense in order to prevent the forfeiture of her property interest in the automobile at
issue. See id. She claimed that she lacked knowledge that her husband would use
the automobile to violate the state indecency law. See id.
93 See id. at 998-99 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926);J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co.
v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395 (1877); United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
State courts have expressly upheld civil forfeiture schemes, like the Michigan
scheme at issue, under very similar circumstances. See, e.g., In re 1976 Blue Ford
Pickup, 586 P.2d 993, 994-96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that, after an innocent
joint tenant of an automobile allows the other joint tenant to act as sole owner, the
forfeiture of the automobile subsequent to the illegal acts of the acting sole owner
does not violate the innocent owner's due process rights); People v. Garner, 732
P.2d 1194, 1196, 1199 (Colo. 1987) (upholding the application of civil forfeiture to
an automobile co-owned by an innocent wife and her husband, who used the automobile illegally to transport a controlled substance).
See Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 1001. The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend.

V.

95 See Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 998. The Bennis Court primarily addressed whether
the forfeiture of Tina Bennis's co-owned automobile constituted a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 998-1001. After disposing
of the petitioner's due process complaint, the Court similarly dismissed her claim
that the Michigan statute violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. See id. at

1001.

See id. at 998-99. The Supreme Court began its analysis of American civil forfeiture tradition with a discussion of nineteenth-century admiralty cases and noted
that these cases stood for the jurisprudential maxim that "[t]he thing is here pri-
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smith Court expressly reserved its opinion "as to whether [forfeiture]
can be extended to property stolen from the owner or otherwise
taken from him without his privity or consent."9 Interpreting this
language, the Chief Justice distinguished between the case of property used without the owner's consent, where the J.W Goldsmith reservation applies, and the case of property employed by an authorized
user but used in an unauthorized capacity.
The Supreme Court,
applying this rationale, held that Tina Bennis could not claim the
innocent owner defense because her husband was a co-owner of the
vehicle." Consequently, because Tina Bennis's husband was an
manly considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the
thing.'" Id. at 998 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14). The Bennis Court further
noted that the Brig Malek Adhel majority declared that "'the acts of the master and
crew... bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty,
and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to
the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.'" Id. (quoting Brig Malek
Adhe, 43 U.S. at 234).
After discussing the admiralty cases, the majority opined that neither lessors
nor secured interest holders are afforded protection from civil forfeiture of their
property interests by the "innocent owner" defense based on Dobbin's Distillery and
Van Oster. See id. The ChiefJustice pointed out that Dobbin's Distillery embraced the
ancient legal principle "'that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the
owner... whether he be innocent or guilty.'" Id. (quoting Dobbin's Distillery,96 U.S.
at 401). The Court then rejected Mrs. Bennis's arguments that forfeiture of her
automobile would be unconstitutional because it was illegally used without her
knowledge and consent. See id. at 999. To support its decision, the Bennis majority
commented that Van Oster mandated "'that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the
revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause ...
Id. (quoting Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468).
Id. at 999 n.5 (cidngj W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 512).
98 See id. (citing Michigan ex rel Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d
483, 495 n.36 (Mich. 1994)). Interpreting theJW Goldsmith language, the United
States Supreme Court in Austin v. United States opined: "The more recent cases have
expressly reserved the question whether the fiction could be employed to forfeit the
property of a truly innocent owner." 509 U.S. 602, 616 (1993). Relying on a legal
distinction drawn by the Michigan Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court in Bennis rejected the Austin interpretation. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
The Michigan Supreme Court noted that when property is used without any consent by the owner, the innocent owner's property could not be forfeited. See Bennis,
527 N.W.2d at 495 n.36. When an owner gives her consent for use of the property
and the property is subsequently used in an unauthorized manner, however, the
innocent owner's property is not protected from abatement. See id.
See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist dismissed Justice Stevens's dissent, commenting that the dissent's reading attempted to broaden the j W Goldsmith reservation into the legal rationale that
forfeiture is only applicable when "'the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed.'" Id. (quoting Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 347, 363 (1808)). The ChiefJustice wrote that Peisch dealt with the same
issue as the J W Goldsmith reservation: "'If,by private theft, or open robbery, without any fault on his part, [an owner's] property should be invaded .... the law can-
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authorized user of the 1977 Pontiac, her case fell outside the rubric
of theJ.W Goldsmith reservation.'00
During its discussion of the Calero-Toledocase, the United States
Supreme Court reiterated the well-established common-law rule that
the innocence of an owner does not present a defense to civil forfeiture.' °' In rejecting Mrs. Bennis's argument that her conduct fell
within the second Calero-Toledo exception, the majority refused to
adopt a prophylactic rule for innocent owners who prove that they
took all reasonable precautions against the illicit use of their property.'02 Furthermore, ChiefJustice Rehnquist commented that CaleroToledo was directly on point because Tina Bennis, like the Pearson
Yacht Company, had no knowledge of the unlawful activity that took
place in her property.03
not be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of that property.'" Id. (quoting
Peisch, 8 U.S. at 364); see also infranotes 128-137 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Stevens's dissent in Bennis).
00 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
101See id. at 999 (stating that "'the innocence of the owner of property subject to
forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.'") (quoting CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974)). The ChiefJustice
strictly followed the historical progression of the development of civil forfeiture law
and rejected Tina Bennis's innocent owner claim. See id. at 998-99. In other words,
the Court invoked the doctrine of stare decisis to ground its holding in a strong legal foundation. See id. But see The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 135, 139 (1996) (arguing that the goals of the stare decisis doctrine of certainty and consistency were not served by the Supreme Court's opinion in Bennis).
Cf United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2140-41 (1996) (where Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who also authored the Bennis majority opinion, implemented a similar
use of precedent and cited to the Court's conclusion in Bennis to ultimately hold
that in rem forfeiture does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution).
1
See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689). Tina Bennis based her argument on the portion of the Calro-Toledo defense that argues that
"it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved
not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed
use of his property .... " Id.
In rejecting Mrs. Bennis's claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Tina Bennis conceded that the Calero-Toledo defense was mere dictum to which the Supreme
Court would give no weight. See id.; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511
U.S. 375, 379 (1994) (stating, "It is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their
dicta, that we must attend .... .").
The Supreme Court did not dismiss the protective effect of the Calero-Toledo exceptions in their entirety. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. In fact, the defense pertaining to the use of property without the owner's consent was expressly preserved
by the Chief Justice. See id.; see also supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text
(discussing the Cakro-Toldeoprotection afforded to innocent owners whose property
is taken without their consent).
103 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999; see also supra notes 81-82 (discussing that the
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Tina Bennis also contended that Foucha v. Louisiana'" and Austin v. United Stateso' applied to the due process analysis of her case
106and that the cases required the recognition of the innocent owner
defense.107 The United States Supreme Court, however, distinguished these cases from the The Palmyraline of forfeiture cases and
upheld the common-law rule.s The Supreme Court distinguished
Foucha on the grounds that that opinion never even mentioned, let
alone rejected, the long-standing practice first announced in The
Palmyra.'" Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to apply Austin
because the case never discussed the validity of the innocent owner
defense."

yacht company had no knowledge of or connection to the controlled substances
that were transported by the lessees).
10
504 U.S. 71 (1992).
105 509 U.S. 602 (1995).
106 Se Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1000.
107

See id.

108 See id. Notwithstanding the well-established legal principles in this area, the
petitioner argued that The Palmyraline of cases should be overruled because Foucha
mandates a culpability requirement. See id. In addition, Mrs. Bennis claimed that
the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, as stated in Austin, could not be
reconciled with the rejection of an innocent owner's defense to a civil forfeiture of
that owner's property. See id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, however, refuted the applica-'
don of Foucha and Austin because those cases had "at best a tangential relation to
the 'innocent owner' doctrine in forfeiture cases." Id.
1 See id. In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Louisiana law that permitted the confinement of a person acquitted from
criminal proceedings by reason of insanity until that person proves that she is not
potentially dangerous to herself or others, even if the person is not mentally ill. See
504 U.S. at 73, 83, 84-85. Writing for the majority, Justice White instructed that the
state statute could serve no punitive purpose because the petitioner had not been
convicted of any crime. See id. at 80. The Court argued that Louisiana could not
punish the petitioner because ajury of his peers acquitted him of the state's criminal charges based on an insanity defense. See id.
Tina Bennis argued that the reasoning in Foucha applied to her case and that,
under a similar analysis, Michigan does not have a punitive interest in forfeiting her
property interest in the automobile at issue. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000. Chief
Justice Rehnquist found it unnecessary to determine whether the abatement and
forfeiture scheme under Michigan law constituted "punishment" for purposes of
Fouc)ha See id. Rather, the ChiefJustice stated that the Foucha analysis did not apply
because that case did not deal with the civil forfeiture of an innocent owner's propert7 interest. See id.
10 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
In Austin, the United States Supreme Court,
held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines applies to the
context of a civil forfeiture. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 617. The Bennis Court found
that Austin did not apply because the Austin Court failed to analyze the necessity of
an innocent owner defense in civil forfeiture proceedings. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at
1000.
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The Supreme Court concluded its due process analysis by addressing the deterrence theory and its role in forfeiture cases."' The
Court declared that forfeiture serves a deterrent purpose separate
from any punitive purpose." 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
forfeiture may prevent any further illegal use as well as levy an economic penalty. 3 The Chief Justice further recognized that the law
of civil forfeiture provides law enforcement officials with an extra
layer of crime deterrence because innocent owners
are compelled to
4
prevent illicit use of their property by others."
In considering the Takings Clause issue, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the forfeiture of the Bennis autoSSee Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000-01. The verb deter is defined as: "To discourage
or stop by fear. To stop or prevent from acting or proceeding by danger, difficulty,
or other consideration which disheartens or countervails the motive for the act."
BLACK'S LAW DianoNARY 450 (6th ed. 1990). Under the economist view, offenders
are deterred by expected punishment, and therefore, they act as risk assessors. See
Catherine Cerna, Economic Theory Applied to Civil Forfeiture: Efficiency and Deterrence
Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HASINGS LJ. 1939, 1956 (1995)
(analogizing offenders to investors because both groups act in their respected capacities until the risk reaches expected return).
Congress has used forfeiture as a vehicle of deterrence in comprehensive
criminal statutes such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1989); see also 115 CONG. Rc. H9951 (daily
ed. Apr. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. Poff) ('After conviction, the ill-gotten gains
must be forfeited to the Government. This sanction is not only poetic justice but a
strong deterrent as well."); 116 CONG. Rzc. S607 (daily ed.Jan. 21, 1970) (statement
of Sen. Byrd) ("By removing its leaders from positions of ownership, by preventing
them and their associates from regaining control, and by visiting heavy economic
sanctions on their predatory business practices this legislation should prove to be a
mighty deterrent to any further expansion of organized crime's economic power.").
Congress used a similar rationale when drafting the forfeiture provision of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
This act seeks to deter the trafficking of illegal drugs through forfeiture. See H.R.
REP. No. 91-1444, at 4567 (1970) ("This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States... by
providing for an overall balance scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving
drugs."); see also United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993)
(reasoning that civil forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Act reduces offenders' incentive to participate in drug trafficking).
1
See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
113 See id.
14 See id. at 1000-01; cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S.
663, 687-88 (1974) (reasoning that the bar against the invocation of an innocent
owner defense will induce property owners to take greater care in allowing the use
of their property to others). The Calero-Toledo Court stated: "To the extent that
such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who
are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property."
Id.
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mobile resulted in a Fifth Amendment taking of private property for
a public use."' The Supreme Court reiterated that Tina Bennis's
property interest in the jointly owned 1977 Pontiac legally transferred to the State of Michigan as a result of John Bennis's illegal activities."6 The Court concluded its opinion by stating that, because
Michigan acquired the automobile pursuant to a power other than
the eminent domain7 authority, the state need not compensate Tina
Bennis for her loss."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's use of precedent and legal tradition in affirming the Michigan
Supreme Court decision.1 The Justice conceded that forfeiture of
an innocent owner's property might seem unfair but in light of the
well-established case law no violation of due process occurred." 9 Fur115 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. The Supreme Court noted that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause applied to the Michigan abatement scheme by way of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
116 See id. Thus, the Court noted that the state lawfully operated
within the jurisprudential bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when it exercised its police powers to abate and forfeit the automobile at issue. See The Supreme
Court, 1995 Term, supra note 101, at 187.
II7 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. The government must make just compensation
when it exercises its eminent domain power under the Fifth Amendment. See
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1978). Just compensation provides the
owner of the property with its fair market value. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
869, 874 (1948). No compensation is required, however, if the property was transferred by a state power other than the power of eminent domain. See Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 1001; Fu//er,409 U.S. at 492 ("[Tlhe Government as condemnor may not be
required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that the Government
has created, or that it might have destroyed under the exercise of governmental
authority other than the power of eminent domain."); United States v. Rands, 889
U.S. 121, 125 (1967) (holding that Congress is not required to compensate owners
when it exercises its commerce power to condemn private land along navigable waters).
1 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 1001-02 (ThomasJ., concurring); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62, at 599 n.46 (explaining that "[r] eliance on history is a familiar
theme in Justice Thomas's jurisprudence."). Justice Thomas observed that forfeiture of property, regardless of the owner's guilt or innocence, has been an accepted
hallmark in English and American jurisprudence since before the ratification of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990)
(defining "due process of law" for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as procedures that are firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of England and
America).
SSee Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring). Further, inJW. Goldsmith, the United States Supreme Court made an identical observation 75 years before Justice Thomas authored his concurring opinion:
If the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent paradoxes
might compel a lengthy discussion to harmonize the section with the
accepted tests of human conduct. ... There is strength... in the
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thermore, Justice Thomas voiced concern regarding the lack of any
well-defined limits on what constitutes a "use" for the purposes of
civil forfeiture law. 2" In conclusion, the concurrence requested that
Congress and state legislatures promulgate guidelines on the government's
ability to forfeit property that belongs to an innocent
12 1
owner.

Justice Ginsburg also authored, a concurring opinion in which
the Justice proffered three reasons to support the holding of the
Michigan Supreme Court.
First, the Justice emphasized that the
Bennis automobile was not only jointly owned by Tina and John, but
that both husband and wife consented to the other's use of the vehicle.'2 ' Stressing that the abatement proceeding of the car at issue was
an equitable action," Justice Ginsburg next explained that the state
supreme court must be given broad discretion when applying the
forfeiture statute.'2 5 Further, Justice Ginsburg posited that the trial
court's decision to abate and forfeit the entire property interest in
the automobile was not "blantandly unfair" as Justice Stevens's dissent contended.'23 Finally, Justice Ginsburg's concurrence articucontention that, if such be the inevitable meaning of the section, it
seems to violate that justice which should be the foundation of the
due process of law required by the Constitution.
254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
120 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas
pointed out that "[improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette
wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose property
is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with
criminals, than a component of a system of justice." Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 81
(1993) (Thomas,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the lack
of any clear bounds on government authority to forfeit real property pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (7)).
1
See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas,J., concurring).
1
See id. (GinsburgJ., concurring).
1
See id.; see also supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between an unauthorized user and an authorized user who uses the object

for an unauthorized purpose).
14 An equitable action is defined as "fojne
seeking an equitable remedy or relief...." BiAcx's LAwDIcnoNAR 538 (6th ed. 1990).

125 See id. In Michigan ex teL Wayne County Prosecutorv. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,
495 (Mich. 1994), the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized the equitable characteristic of the abatement and forfeiture proceeding. Given an equitable proceeding, the court noted that the trial judge had the discretion to utilize any of a number of possible remedies, including forfeiture. See id. The Michigan Supreme
Court then sanctioned the trial judge's determination to abate and forfeit the entire
interest in the automobile. See id.
12 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice
Ginsburg
based her determination upon two principles: (1) the Bennises owned another car
and (2) the petitioner would not receive any monetary compensation because the
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lated that it is well within the bounds of state police power to deter,
by means of civil forfeiture, the use of property that contributes to
"neighborhood blight."'"
In dissent, Justice Stevens opined that the majority's reasoning
would bestow upon the states carte blanche authority to forfeit property that has any connection with an unlawful act.'" The Justice
commenced his dissent by identifying the three categories of property subject to forfeiture: (1) pure contraband," (2) proceeds of
criminal activity,"" and (3) tools or instrumentalities of a criminal
trade."" With the three aforementioned categories of forfeitable
difference between the automobile's worth, approximately $600, and the costs associated with impoundment and abatement of the automobile, was nominal. See id.
12 See id.
128 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens declared:
"The State surely
may impose strict obligations on the owners ... but neither logic nor history supports the Court's apparent assumption that their complete innocence imposes no
constitutional impediment to the seizure of their property simply because it provided the locus for a criminal transaction."
1
See id. at 1004 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that states have a
strong interest in confiscating contraband notwithstanding the guilt or innocence
of their owners. See id. Examples of contraband include smuggled goods, adulterated food, narcotics, and sawed-off shotguns. See id.; see also One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 308 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (defining contraband as "objects
the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime."). Relying on these
definitions of contraband,Justice Stevens concluded that this category of forfeitable
property was not implicated because automobiles are not contraband items. See
Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1004 (citing Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699).
1,0 See Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1004 (StevensJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that
in recent years Congress has enacted legislation that extends the coverage of the
second category of property to include a wide array of items. See id. Stressing that
this federal legislation is replete with references to the innocent owner defense, Justice Stevens posited that the existence of such protections within congressional acts
lends support to the need for "elementary notions of fairness" when a governmental
entity operates outside the jurisdiction of these acts. See id.; see also Guerra, supra
note 16, at 368 (discussing the existence of an innocent owner defense in federal
legislation regarding the forfeiture of property used in connection with the sale of
illegal drugs).
VSee Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1004-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the tolls or instrumentalities of the criminal trade category are also
known as "derivative contraband." See id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699). Referring to cases such as The Palmyra and Brig
Malh Adhe4Justice Stevens explained that the notion of the forfeiture of derivative
contraband, regardless of the innocence of the property's owner, is rooted in early
admiralty law. See id. at 1004 & n.2, 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice
stated that the underlying reasoning of these cases was based on the presumption
that owners of valuable property are "aware of the principal use being made of that
property." Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Next, the dissent articulated that
the aforementioned reasoning should not be extended to factual scenarios other
than admiralty cases. See id. But see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 49, 53 (1932) (seizure of automobile used to unlawfully import liq-
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property in mind, Justice Stevens next distinguished the facts of Bennis from the precedent relied on by the majority.1 The dissent explained that the principal use of the forfeited property in this case,
unlike the use of the challenged property in The Palmyra line of
cases, was not the commission of illegal acts.'-'
Even if a legal nexus existed between the Bennis automobile
and the criminal act, Justice Stevens would have reversed the strict
liability standard imposed by the majority on the grounds of fundamental fairness.'" The Justice qualified this proposition by instructing that the Calero-Toledo exceptions to forfeiture should apply when
owners have taken all reasonable steps to guard against illegal use.'s
uor into the United States); United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 286 U.S. 63, 66
(1932) (same); Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877)
(forfeiting premises that contained an illegal distillery).
1st See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
Iss See id. Justice Stevens noted the lack of evidence suggesting that the Bennis
automobile previously acted as a site for "forbidden trysts." See id. The Justice continued, "An isolated misuse of a stationary vehicle should not justify the forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property on the theory that it constituted an instrumentality
of the crime.* Id.; cf. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
512 (1921) (expressing doubt as to the appropriateness of the forfeiture of an entire ocean liner because one passenger engaged in an illegal activity on board).
Justice Stevens commenced the analysis by pointing out that leading forfeiture
case law involved some mode of transportation. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663, 665-66 (1974) (discussing the forfeiture of a yacht used to transport controlled substances); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 465-66 (1926) (forfeiting
automobile under a state statute that made the transportation of liquor illegal);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134 (1925) (addressing the forfeiture of an
automobile illegally used to transport whiskey and gin). The Justice then pointed
out that the Bennis automobile was not a necessary element in the commission of a
crime. See Bennis, 116 S. CL at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent opined
that Mr. Bennis's "forbidden trysts" could have occurred in a multitude of locations
other than in the 1977 Pontiac. See id. at 1005, 1006 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
154 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice stressed
Mrs. Bennis's innocence of any crime committed by her husband and therefore
found that she should not be held responsible for his illicit conduct. See id. The
dissent posited that the precedent relied on by the majority was interpreted by the
Court three terms earlier in Austin. See id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 615 (1993)). Unlike the Bennis majority, Justice Stevens commented that the
Austin Court held that the idea of punishing property for its own guilt stems from
the existence of some negligence on the part of the property's owner. See id. (citing
Austin, 509 U.S. at 615). Applying this rationale, Justice Stevens declared the forfeiture in Bennis unconstitutional because Mrs. Bennis did not act negligently when
she entrusted the car to her husband. See id.
M See id. at 1007-08 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 68890). Justice Stevens applied the second Calero-Toledo exception, which provides that
an owner cannot be punished if she proves that she took all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of her property. See id. at 1008 (StevensJ., dissenting).
Additionally, the Justice implied that the first instance of the Calero-Toledo de-
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Justice Stevens's dissent contended that because Mrs. Bennis possessed neither knowledge of her husband's intent to commit a
criminal act nor any knowledge of any similar past acts, it could not
be alleged that she failed to take reasonable steps to prevent her
husband's deviant and unlawful behavior."" Justice Stevens concluded that, even though this case did not present an opportunity to
differentiate between permissible and impermissible forfeitures, the
"blatant unfairness" of the 1977 Pontiac forfeiture demonstrated the
unconstitutionality of the Michigan statutory scheme.', 7
Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissenting opinion in which the
Justice acknowledged the well-recognized legal tradition of admiralty
forfeiture.'TM The Justice also noted, however, that the admiralty tradition does not provide an absolute justification for the modern forfeiture of an innocent owner's vessel 5 Furthermore, forfeiture of
the property interest in this case, the dissent concluded, would be a
violation of due process because Mrs. Bennis acted neither negligently nor compliantly as to her husband's illegal action."4
In accord with Justice Stevens's dissent, many commentators
have posited that the Supreme Court should have reversed the
fense may also apply to the circumstances surrounding the illegal use of the Bennis
automobile. See id. This exception protects innocent owners "whose property... had been taken from [them] without [their] privity or consent."

Calro-

Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. Justice Stevens posited that Mrs. Bennis "is just as blameless
as if a thief, rather than her husband, had used the car in a criminal episode." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4

Cranch) 347, 364 (1808) (commenting that stolen property is not subject to forfeiture if it is subsequently used in the commission of an illegal act).
1
See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent further
contended: 'There is no reason to think that the threat of forfeiture will deter an
individual from buying a car with her husband-or from marrying him in the first
place-if she neither knows nor has reason to know that he plans to use it wrongful." Id. at 1009 (StevensJ., dissenting).
8 e id. at 1010 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
, Seeid. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 62,
at 622 (discussing the application of in rem forfeiture in admiralty cases). Justice
Kennedy reiterated that the guilt or innocence of an owner was not a factor in the
forfeiture of a vessel used for illicit purposes. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 1010
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210 (1844)).
9 See Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Justice Kennedy
agreed with Justice Stevens that the two Calro-Todo exceptions work to negate the
unequivocal forfeiture tradition founded in admiralty and maritime law. See id. at
1011 (KennedyJ, dissenting) (citing Calro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688-90). The Kennedy dissent expanded on this line of legal reasoning and argued that admiralty
precedent can remain intact without extending its application to the Bennis automobile. See id.
140

Se id.
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Michigan Supreme Court on the grounds of fundamental fairness.'
The critics point out that Tina Bennis should not be forced to endure forfeiture of her property interest on account of her husband's
need to fulfill his deviant sexual desires in the front seat of their
jointly owned car. Further, supporters of Tina Bennis ask: should
she lose both her husband's fidelity and her 1977 Pontiac? Chief
Justice Rehnquist seemed to think so, and for some very good reasons. Nonetheless, did the Bennis majority ignore fairness considerations when upholding Michigan's forfeiture of Tina's property?
At first blush, Bennis seems to epitomize inequity and legal irrationality. Upon further analysis, however, it becomes evident that
the holding rests on long-established precedential and public policy
grounds. Despite the Chief Justice's sugar-coating of the case, the
bitter taste of unfairness remains.
The omission of the innocent owner defense from civil forfeiture tradition has been documented throughout United States jurisprudence.'" As the Chief Justice correctly noted, well-grounded
precedent mandated that Tina Bennis be precluded14from using her
innocence to defeat the forfeiture of her automobile. Notions of public policy also buttress the legal reasoning of the
Bennis holding. First and foremost, goals of crime prevention are
supported by forcing an innocent owner to keep a careful eye on
who is using her property.'" Second, precluding the innocent owner
defense relieves the government of the burden of proving collusion
in scenarios where the alleged innocent owner may have had knowledge of or consented to the illegal use.'" Third, public policy would
be better served if the judicial branch refrained from defining the
parameters of the innocent owner defense.
In the realm of promoting the goals of public policy, forfeiture
can also act as a powerful deterrent to criminal activity. With economic and other punitive reprecussions, criminals soon realize that
probable forfeiture of their property makes prosecution a high price
to pay for illegal activity.'" Commentators point to the argument
See Deborah Jones Merritt, Supreme Court 1995-96 Year in Review: Forfeitureand
Real Feminismv, N.J. L.J., Aug. 26, 1996, at 850 (stating that the press has criticized
the Court for not compensating Tina Bennis for her half interest in the 1977 Pontiac).
42 See supra notes 52-88 and accompanying
text.
'"
See Aennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
'" See id. at 100-01.
1
See Merritt, supra note 141, at 850 (discussing public policy arguments supporting the Bennis majority).
1
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974)
1
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that offering an innocent owner defense would not seemingly disturb the goal of deterrence."7 This argument fails to recognize that
criminals will avoid forfeiting their property merely by using the
property of others in the commission of illegal activities."
An "eternal struggle [] exists between the avarice, enterprize
and combinations of individuals on the one hand, and the power
charged with the administration of the laws on the other, severe laws
are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry into effect
the measures of policy adopted by the legislature."'" In the face of
the public policy and precedential justifications provided by the Bennis majority, the "severe laws" of forfeiture remain inherently inequitable to innocent owners such as Tina Bennis.
Indeed, perhaps it is best to heed the advice of Justice Thomas
and spur legislators to overrule expressly the preclusion of the innocent owner defense and promulgate statutes that will better preserve
the property interests of innocent parties.'" It would be a futile attempt at judicial legislation if the judicial branch was given the responsibility of defining the parameters of such a defense. To Tina
Bennis's dismay, the law as it currently stands forces innocent owners
to guard against the unexpected and, in some unfortunate cases, to
remain the victim of outdated common law rules.
Joseph G. CaleUa

(noting that forfeiture of property used in illegal activities imposed upon the criminal an economic penalty that renders the illegal behavior unprofitable); Cerna, supra note 111, at 1956 (describing criminals as economic risk-takers).
See Merritt, supra note 141, at 850.
1
See id. ('If the state cannot enforce forfeiture against innocent owners, then
criminals who rent, finance, or borrow their vehicles will suffer less than wrongdoers who pay cash for their cars.").
1
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 405 (1814).
JW &eBennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1003 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting that the Constitution assigns the role of protector of hapless innocent owners to the political branches of the federal government and the state governments).

